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FROM APPENDIX TO HEART: TRACING 
THE HISTORY OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
THE HEART OF THE CONSTITUTION: HOW THE 
BILL OF RIGHTS BECAME THE BILL OF RIGHTS. 
Gerard N. Magliocca.1 New York: Oxford University Press, 
2018. Pp. xii + 235. $29.95 (Hardcover). 
Lael Weinberger2 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE THINGS  
WE TAKE FOR GRANTED 
The upper level of the National Archives museum features 
three documents, grandly presented in a marble rotunda: the 
Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of 
Rights. When the hall is open for visitors, the documents are 
displayed behind bulletproof glass and constantly attended by 
guards; at night, the documents are stored still more securely in a 
bomb-proof vault.3 “In this Rotunda are the most cherished 
material possessions of a great and good nation,” President 
George W. Bush said in 2003 at an event reopening the hall after 
a major renovation.4 Every branch of government was 
represented at the event, offering encomiums to the documents 
enshrined in the hall. Many commentators have observed that 
these documents are a kind of American scripture, sacred texts 
that every good citizen professes to honor.5 
 
 1. Samuel R. Rosen Professor at the Indiana University Robert H. McKinney 
School of Law. 
 2. Raoul Berger-Mark DeWolfe Howe Legal History Fellow, Harvard Law School. 
 3. Hilary Parkinson, The Men and Women Who Guard the Constitution, NAT’L 
ARCHIVES: PIECES OF HISTORY (March 29, 2016), https://prologue.blogs.archives.gov/
2016/03/29/the-men-and-women-who-guard-the-constitution/; ATOMIC AUDIT: THE 
COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS SINCE 1940, 322 (Stephen I. 
Schwartz ed., 1998). 
 4. The Rotunda for the Charters of Freedom Reopens at the National Archives, 
PROLOGUE MAGAZINE, Winter 2003, Vol. 35, No. 4, https://www.archives.gov/
publications/prologue/2003/winter/rededication.html. 
 5. I borrow the language of “American scripture” from PAULINE MAIER, 
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It was not always this way. In The Heart of the Constitution, 
Gerard Magliocca explains that the Bill of Rights was not just 
relegated to the status of afterthought for many years—it was in 
fact not even recognized as a single, unified document for much 
of its history. The Bill of Rights was not always known as “the Bill 
of Rights.” 
Magliocca has crafted a work of history about the idea of the 
Bill of Rights. The book is less a history of the Bill of Rights as 
law than it is the history of the Bill of Rights as concept and as 
rhetoric. This is not a history of the ways that legally enforceable 
provisions of the document were interpreted, applied, litigated, or 
enforced. The focus is on how people’s ideas about a particular 
set of amendments to the Constitution evolved to see them as a 
single and iconic embodiment of American ideas and legal ideals. 
This review highlights three of Magliocca’s key arguments 
before concluding by considering the open questions that 
Magliocca leaves. Part II considers his evaluation of the bill of 
rights genre in the late eighteenth century. Part III turns to 
Magliocca’s account of neglect—the long period in which the Bill 
of Rights just didn’t appear in American discourse. Part IV 
describes (and offers some qualifications to) his explanation for 
increased interest in the Bill of Rights. Part V reflects on the limits 
of Magliocca’s methodology. 
II. THE BILL OF RIGHTS AS GENRE 
The first “bill of rights” to claim the name was the English 
Bill of Rights of 1689, and this is where Magliocca starts his story. 
The English Bill of Rights was a product of the Glorious 
Revolution (1688), when Parliament deposed James II and 
installed William of Orange on the throne. James had posed a 
threat to the rights of Englishmen, said the theorists of the 
revolution, and Parliament’s action had vindicated those rights. 
Parliament, convened irregularly without a king, issued a 
declaration of rights. After William took the throne, Parliament 
 
AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1997) 
(describing the creation and constant reinterpretation of the Declaration of 
Independence) and from Gordon Wood, Dusting Off the Declaration, THE N.Y. REV. OF 
BOOKS, Aug. 14, 1997 (reviewing Maier’s book and referencing the National Archives’ 
display as an example of the veneration of the document). Maier later extended the 
observation to the Bill of Rights: Pauline Maier, The Strange History of the Bill of Rights, 
15 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 497 (2017). 
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was properly assembled as such. It then put the rights into a bill 
and enacted that through its normal process, creating the Bill of 
Rights. 
Magliocca argues that this established a template that would 
influence another generation of “bills of rights” enacted by the 
American colonists almost a century later, during their conflict 
with crown and Parliament. Magliocca argues that the phrase “bill 
of rights” was associated with a particular kind of document in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: a document with rhetorical 
flair, introduced by a rousing preamble, issued either as a stand-
alone declaration or at the start of a constitution. The Continental 
Congress followed the example of the English when it drafted the 
“Declaration of Rights and Grievances” in 1774. As the newly-
independent American colonies became states, several of them 
drafted their own bills of rights. Virginia was the trendsetter. 
Magliocca points out that the Virginia Declaration (1776) took 
cues from the English Bill of Rights. Like the English version, the 
Virginia Declaration was also issued as a stand-alone document 
and was used to justify a revolution. He also argues that both 
documents placed the enumeration of individual rights as 
secondary to its more philosophical statements on the nature of 
government. Shortly thereafter, the Declaration of Independence 
itself drew on the example of the English Bill of Rights. Magliocca 
argues that both documents had parallel emphases: they placed 
blame for violations of the law and of the (unwritten) English 
constitution and then enumerated those violations. 
Magliocca makes two points about this history. The first is 
that a bill of rights was a useful rhetorical tool used during times 
of political unrest. His more surprising and provocative point is 
that bills of rights were political and not legal documents. They 
helped to explain and justify controversial decisions, such as 
revolution. The enumeration of rights was not done with an eye 
to legal enforcement. Their drafters did not seriously contemplate 
these rights being invoked in court. 
With this backdrop, Magliocca turns to the subject of this 
book, the first ten amendments to the United States Constitution 
that we now call the “Bill of Rights.” Magliocca situates this in a 
crisp but conventional narration of the controversy over the 
United States Constitution and the call for a “bill of rights.”6 But 
 
 6. The story has been told many times as part of the larger story of the debate over 
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he has something new to offer when he gets to the actual 
enactment of the Bill of Rights. Magliocca’s point is that, by the 
time the first Congress began creating what we now think of as 
the bill of rights, the project had stopped looking like a “bill of 
rights”—that is, not what people at the time would have 
recognized as a bill of rights. It wasn’t enacted as a freestanding 
statement of rights. It was a set of individually-enacted 
amendments to a legal document. The amendments could be 
voted on and ratified one at a time, not as a single statement. (The 
first two amendments proposed by Congress in 1789 were not 
ratified by the states. The original second amendment would be 
ratified two centuries later as the Twenty-Seventh Amendment.) 
It lacked the preamble that gave previous American bills of rights 
thematic coherence. The amendments had a political function, to 
be sure. But the form the set of amendments as a whole took was 
different from prior bills of rights that explicitly justified major 
government change. This bill of rights was part of a deal to handle 
challenges to the Constitution’s legitimacy, but that’s not quite the 
same as justifying the change directly, as previous bills of rights 
did. In short, Magliocca has made a case that there was a 
recognizable form for bills of rights in the late eighteenth 
century—and that the “Bill of Rights” of 1789 didn’t fit the genre. 
III. THE BILL OF RIGHTS AS FORGOTTEN TEXT 
The theme for the next hundred years of the Bill of Rights’ 
history is neglect. Many commentators have noted that individual 
provisions of the Bill of Rights appeared only rarely in the 
nineteenth century courts.7 This was partly a consequence of the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Barron v. Baltimore,8 that the 
limitations on government provided in the amendments bound 
only the federal government, not the states. In Barron itself, the 
Court described the amendments to the Constitution as just 
that—“amendments,” not a bill of rights.9 
 
ratification of the Constitution. The current benchmark source on the ratification debates 
is PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–
1788 (2011). The first academic monograph devoted to the Bill of Rights as a whole was 
EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY (1959).  
 7. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND 
RECONSTRUCTION 290 (1998). 
 8. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833). 
 9. Id. at 250. 
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On the scattered occasions when Magliocca finds Americans 
using the phrase “bill of rights” in the nineteenth century, they 
often aren’t even referring to the first ten amendments. In Barron, 
for instance, Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion references the 
Constitution’s Article One, Section Nine, as “in the nature of a 
bill of rights.”10 Other cases cited the limitations on the states in 
Article One, Section Ten, as a “bill of rights.”11 In broader public 
discourse, newspapers, speeches, and pamphlets referred to the 
Declaration of Independence as a national bill of rights. 
Reconstruction marked an extraordinary exception to the 
general neglect of the Bill of Rights. Representative John 
Bingham, one of the key architects of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, spoke loudly and often about the importance of 
safeguarding the Bill of Rights against state infringement. A 
substantial literature and jurisprudence has built up around the 
question of whether the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the 
Bill of Rights (in whole or in part) against the states (and, if so, 
what clause of the amendment actually accomplishes this result).12 
Magliocca avoids this debate. His point is conceptually prior to 
this debate: when Bingham and other Congressional Republicans 
 
 10. Id. at 248. 
 11. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 138 (1810) (describing Article One, Section Ten, as 
“what may be deemed a bill of rights for the people of each state”); Piqua Branch of State 
Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 57 U.S. 369, 392 (1853) (“It is, in the emphatic language of Chief 
Justice Marshall, a bill of rights to the people of the States, incorporated into the 
fundamental law of the Union.”). 
 12. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341–43 (1963) (describing 
incorporation via the Due Process Clause); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 4–6 (1964) (same); 
McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (applying the modern approach of selective 
incorporation); Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (same); Adamson v. California, 332 
U.S. 46, 71–72 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing for total incorporation); id. at 59–68 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (arguing against incorporation); McDonald, 561 U.S. at 806–
13 (Thomas, J., concurring in part) (arguing for incorporation via the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause). If this isn’t enough, the scholarly literature offers still other options. 
See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE 
L.J. 1193 (1992) (arguing the Due Process Clause incorporates only those Bill of Rights 
provisions that safeguard the rights of citizens); KURT T. LASH, THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT AND THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP (2014) 
(claiming the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects all enumerated rights in the Bill of 
Rights and elsewhere); Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Privileges or Immunities 
Clause Abridged: A Critique of Kurt Lash on the Fourteenth Amendment, 95 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (contending the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects 
enumerated and unenumerated rights alike); and CHRISTOPHER R. GREEN, EQUAL 
CITIZENSHIP, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE ORIGINAL SENSE OF THE 
PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE (2015) (arguing the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
protects the equality of similarly-situated citizens of the United States).  
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started talking about the “Bill of Rights,” they were taking an 
unusual step to give a name to this first group of amendments to 
the Constitution. Democratic members of Congress who opposed 
the Fourteenth Amendment did not adopt the name, “Bill of 
Rights,” but persisted in referring to them as “‘limitations’” on 
Congressional power or “‘clauses of the Constitution’” (p. 64). 
And as the debate progressed, it became clear that even among 
the Amendment’s supporters, there was disagreement about how 
many of the Constitution’s amendments deserved the “Bill of 
Rights” title. Some Congressional Republicans talked about the 
first ten amendments but others talked about only the first eight—
excluding the Ninth Amendment’s reference to unenumerated 
rights and the Tenth Amendment’s limitation of the federal 
government to delegated powers. The confusion about what 
exactly was meant when the term was used was just another 
indication that the document which we take for granted now was 
not thought of as a unified piece of the American heritage at the 
time. 
In any case, the era of enthusiasm for the “Bill of Rights”—
however many amendments that included—was brief. “Like most 
of the lofty ideals of Reconstruction,” Magliocca writes, 
“[Bingham’s] understanding of the first set of amendments fizzled 
during the 1870s and 1880s.” (p. 66). The Supreme Court didn’t 
adopt the term “Bill of Rights” in the aftermath of 
Reconstruction. It referenced amendments to the Constitution, 
collectively or individually. In a lecture in 1880, Justice Miller 
insisted, “‘Our Constitution . . . does not contain any formal 
declaration or bill of rights.’” (p. 67). New state constitutions 
drafted by former Confederate states modeled their bills of rights 
on the Virginia Declaration of Rights rather than the federal 
Constitution’s first several amendments. The one exception was 
that many of them included a state analogue to the federal 
Thirteenth Amendment prohibiting slavery—demonstrating, 
Magliocca argues, that the “assumption . . . that only a 
constitutional amendment proposed in 1789 can be part of the Bill 
of Rights” was a still more modern invention. (p. 68). The 
Reconstruction conception of the Bill of Rights was not gone 
entirely. It made a brief but notable appearance in a dissent by 
Justice John Marshall Harlan. The Supreme Court majority had 
decided that the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply the Fifth 
Amendment’s Grand Jury Clause or the Sixth Amendment’s Jury 
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Trial Clause to the states—and it did so without describing the 
rights as part of a bill of rights.13 Harlan argued for incorporation 
of these limits on the states and described the first ten 
amendments as “the national Bill of Rights” throughout his 
opinion.14 It was a hint at what was to come. 
IV. THE BILL OF RIGHTS AS JUSTIFICATION FOR 
GOVERNMENT POWER 
Up to this point, the book’s primary focus has been on 
deconstructing the naïve idea that the Bill of Rights is a constant 
in the American experience. To the contrary, Magliocca shows 
that it was not even thought of as a single, unified document for a 
substantial part of its own history. But when the book’s narrative 
reaches the end of the nineteenth century, it takes a turn toward 
a new, positive argument about how the Bill of Rights came to 
prominence in American law and culture. According to 
Magliocca, the Bill of Rights came to prominence when 
Americans wanted to justify broader government powers. 
In popular culture, the Bill of Rights is thought of primarily 
as protecting individual rights and constraining the government. 
But Magliocca argues that in practice it often worked in the 
opposite manner. It’s not as though the Bill of Rights grants the 
government additional power. Rather, Magliocca suggests that 
the existence of the Bill of Rights diverted opposition and 
assuaged fears that might otherwise arise about expansive 
government power. Justice Robert Jackson made the point in his 
famous opinion in West Virginia State Board of Education v. 
Barnette: “Assurance that rights are secure tends to diminish fear 
and jealousy of strong government, and by making us feel safe to 
live under it makes for its better support.”15 
This pro-government-power function of the Bill of Rights 
goes all the way back to the beginning, as Magliocca reminds 
readers. In the debates over ratification of the Constitution, some 
diehard antifederalists suggested that talk of adding a bill of rights 
was a distraction from the real danger: the powerful federal 
government that would be created by the new Constitution. 
Eighteenth-century whalers would distract their quarry by tossing 
 
 13. See Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900). 
 14. Id. at 607 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 15. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 636 (1943). 
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a tub into the sea; antifederalists said that any bill of rights would 
be nothing but a tub thrown to the whale.16 But the tub was tossed, 
the Constitution amended, and what followed was roughly a 
century of inaction for the “Bill of Rights.” 
Magliocca argues that the surprising turning point for the Bill 
of Rights was the introduction of formal American empire. In the 
aftermath of the late nineteenth century, the United States 
acquired overseas holdings that almost no one anticipated making 
into states. (This at least helps distinguish this colonies from the 
“domestic empire” that characterized so much prior American 
expansion.)17 The largest population among these imperial 
holdings was in the Philippines. Critics of empire argued that it 
was hypocritical of the United States to proclaim its adherence to 
liberty while governing territories captured and held without 
traditional American protections for individual liberties. And 
strikingly, these complaints increasingly invoked the “Bill of 
Rights” as the paradigmatic example of the rights held by 
Americans. President William McKinley answered the critics by 
sending instructions to the Philippine Commission, led by William 
Howard Taft as the interim government for the islands. The Bill 
of Rights wouldn’t be applied entire, but the government did have 
to respect a substantial subset of the federal Bill of Rights. This 
became a debating point as the election cycle got underway in 
1900. It also made its way into the Supreme Court. 
The first case in which a Supreme Court majority called the 
first set of amendments the “Bill of Rights” was Kepner v. United 
States,18 one of the so-called “Insular Cases,” which considered 
which federal constitutional provisions applied in the territories 
acquired by the United States in the Spanish-American War. 
(Magliocca notes that it is also unique in being the only case to 
suggest that the first nine amendments to the Constitution 
constituted the Bill of Rights.) Magliocca points out that there’s 
still something strange going on: the Court used the “Bill of 
 
 16. See Kenneth R. Bowling, “A Tub to the Whale”: The Founding Fathers and 
Adoption of the Federal Bill of Rights, 8 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 223 (1988). 
 17. On the various facets of empire in American history and historiography, see Paul 
A. Kramer, Power and Connection: Imperial Histories of the United States in the World, 
116 AM. HIST. REV. 1348 (2011). For accessible treatments of empire in American history, 
see WALTER NUGENT, HABITS OF EMPIRE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN EXPANSION 
(2008) and DANIEL IMMERWAHR, HOW TO HIDE AN EMPIRE: A HISTORY OF THE 
GREATER UNITED STATES (2019). 
 18. See Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904). 
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Rights” terminology repeatedly in this opinion, but had not done 
so in other cases decided shortly before Kepner, which involved 
the question of incorporation against the states. Why the 
difference? Magliocca suggests that it was another version of the 
“tub to the whale” scenario: the Court was likely “supportive of 
congressional power over the Philippines and wanted to shore up 
the legitimacy of that authority by underscoring how it was used 
to apply the Bill of Rights” (p. 83). By contrast, “in incorporation 
cases the Court (save Justice Harlan) was not supportive and 
wanted to delegitimize extending the first set of amendments to 
the states” (p. 83). 
In Magliocca’s telling, the next really big breakthrough for 
the Bill of Rights taking its place in the conceptual maps of 
Americans was the New Deal. The “master politician” and 
communicator, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, invoked the Bill 
of Rights repeatedly as he defended his New Deal policies against 
detractors. Again, the main function of this rhetorical use of the 
Bill of Rights was to “legitimate the growth of federal power” (p. 
93). Critics of the New Deal said that the expansion of federal 
regulation came at the expense of personal liberty. Roosevelt 
responded that so long as the Bill of Rights was intact, liberty was 
preserved. The Bill of Rights didn’t have to authorize New Deal 
policies to nonetheless help validate them, when Roosevelt could 
explain that he was acting within the scope of his lawful conduct. 
Roosevelt becomes a key figure in Magliocca’s search for the 
turning point, where the Bill of Rights goes from being merely a 
set of disparate amendments to the Constitution to being a totem 
of American freedom. 
Magliocca notes that Roosevelt’s critics also picked up 
references to the Bill of Rights. The Republican Party platform in 
1936 cited the Bill of Rights when it proclaimed its devotion to “‘a 
government of laws’,” as opposed to “‘the autocratic perils of a 
government of men.’” (p. 94). This was an obvious jab at 
Roosevelt, who was regularly accused by conservative critics of 
being a potential authoritarian. 
The Bill of Rights was back again during the debate over the 
court-packing plan in 1937. Frustrated with the Supreme Court’s 
repeated holdings that aspects of the New Deal exceeded 
congressional authority, Roosevelt proposed adding new seats to 
the Supreme Court, which of course he would get to fill. This time, 
Roosevelt’s critics wielded the Bill of Rights to successfully 
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oppose his plans: they argued that Roosevelt threatened judicial 
independence and that this in turn weakened the protections 
provided by the Bill of Rights. 
The New Deal and its surrounding controversies propelled 
the Bill of Rights toward the center of national conversation as 
never before. But the final step toward securing their place was 
World War II. Roosevelt’s “four freedoms” nodded to the Bill of 
Rights when establishing the Allies’ wartime ideology of 
defending freedom. For American audiences in particular, 
Roosevelt frequently invoked the freedoms protected by the Bill 
of Rights as among the most cherished American values at stake 
in the war. Lose the war, and authoritarians would destroy these 
safeguards. 
At the same time, the Supreme Court too took up the banner 
of the Bill of Rights. After abandoning the protection of freedom 
of contract and expanding the commerce clause, the Supreme 
Court fell back on the Bill of Rights as the final constraint on the 
federal government. Magliocca writes that Justice Felix 
Frankfurter was the first justice to make the Bill of Rights a 
regular feature of the Court’s rhetoric, even though Frankfurter 
himself was more skeptical than many of his colleagues about 
aggressive judicial enforcement of individual rights claims. 
Magliocca highlights the famous pair of rulings on whether 
compulsory recitations of the Pledge of Allegiance in public 
schools were constitutional—the Court first said yes in Gobitis,19 
only to reverse itself in Barnette.20 Magliocca reads Barnette as a 
wartime case, with allusions to the Nazi threat in the majority 
opinion’s castigation of enforced conformity. It is also one of the 
great paeans to the Bill of Rights in the Supreme Court’s history. 
In it, Magliocca finds a bridge between the government-
empowering Bill of Rights that the book has highlighted up to this 
point, and the libertarian Bill of Rights21 that Magliocca has used 
as his foil. The Court’s majority opinion by Justice Jackson was 
written with the New Deal in view—this is the case in which 
Jackson explained that the Bill of Rights made possible a robust 
government. But he also articulated the libertarian view of the 
 
 19. See Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
 20. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. 
 21. “Libertarian” here is simply a useful shorthand for the cluster of attitudes that 
often characterize contemporary treatment of the Bill of Rights—viewing the document 
as a restraint on government power and a protection for personal liberty.  
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Bill of Rights in powerful prose that has deeply influenced several 
generations of lawyers and jurists: “The very purpose of a Bill of 
Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of 
political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities 
and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied 
by the courts.”22 
There’s reason to quibble with Magliocca’s emphasis at this 
point. Both in the treatment of the New Deal in general and in his 
treatment of the court packing controversy, he gives only cursory 
coverage to Roosevelt’s opponents. Part of this may be a product 
of Magliocca being less than precise in defining his argument 
about government power. To the extent Magliocca is simply 
intent on making the case that the Bill of Rights has functioned to 
enable government power, it’s understandable that his coverage 
of the other side is brief—his readers already know that the Bill 
of Rights can function to criticize government power. But to the 
extent Magliocca wants to make a stronger claim, that the Bill of 
Rights was more often used to support enhanced government 
power, or was more effective in this role, the point is weakened by 
his failure to seriously engage with the opposition to the New 
Deal. And to the extent Magliocca’s objective is to identify 
turning points in the rhetoric around the Bill of Rights, it is 
curious that there isn’t more attention devoted to the Bill of 
Rights rhetoric wielded against Roosevelt. 
A considerable body of scholarly work has argued that the 
New Deal catalyzed a conservative critique along many fronts, 
playing an important role in the origins of modern political and 
legal conservatism.23 The Bill of Rights appeared repeatedly in the 
 
 22. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 638. 
 23. For sampling of this literature, and its internal debates over the importance of 
the New Deal relative to other issues in the development of modern conservatism, consider 
KIM PHILLIPS-FEIN, INVISIBLE HANDS: THE MAKING OF THE CONSERVATIVE 
MOVEMENT FROM THE NEW DEAL TO REAGAN (2009) (discussing the role of business 
leaders in constructing modern conservatism); GREGORY L. SCHNEIDER, THE 
CONSERVATIVE CENTURY: FROM REACTION TO REVOLUTION (2009) (discussing 
conservatism’s transition into a democratic political movement); CONSERVATISM AND 
AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (Brian J. Glenn & Steven M. Teles, eds. 2009) 
(studying the influence of conservatism on domestic policy and how the growth of the 
government has shaped conservatism); DAVID FARBER, THE RISE AND FALL OF MODERN 
AMERICAN CONSERVATISM (2010) (starting the history of modern American 
conservatism with the opposition to the New Deal); GORDON LLOYD & DAVID 
DAVENPORT, THE NEW DEAL AND MODERN AMERICAN CONSERVATISM: A DEFINING 
RIVALRY (2013) (focusing on the economic debates that have defined liberalism and 
conservatism since the Great Depression); KATHRYN S. OLMSTED, RIGHT OUT OF 
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rhetoric of the opposition. A quick search through the New York 
Times archive is illustrative. A Letter to the Editor in 1933 
complained that a proposal to add a “child labor amendment” to 
the Constitution (supported by Secretary of Labor Frances 
Perkins), permitting government regulation, would enable the 
state to interfere with the liberties of families which otherwise 
were shielded by the Bill of Rights.24 When Theodore Roosevelt, 
Jr., son of the former president, took the helm of the National 
Republican Club in 1934, he announced that the Republican 
theme in the fall congressional election cycle would be a fight “for 
personal liberty, for the Bill of Rights—a fight for the  
spirit of America.”25 Former-president-turned-administration-
critic Herbert Hoover used the Bill of Rights as his main theme in 
a major speech broadcast nationwide in 1935.26 A 1934 Letter to 
the Editor took Roosevelt to task for disregarding the Bill of 
Rights: “In some instances my rights have been violated. In others 
Mr. Roosevelt has attempted, unsuccessfully, to take away from 
the people some of the liberties guaranteed under the Bill of 
Rights.”27 The list of examples could go on—and this is just from 
one newspaper. 
The presidential rhetoric about the Bill of Rights in the early 
New Deal—which is highlighted in The Heart of the 
Constitution—is actually quite reactionary. A Letter to the Editor 
in the New York Times defended Roosevelt by referencing the 
Bill of Rights, an echo of the president’s own rhetoric in 
responding to these critics: the president “has not scrapped our 
Bill of Rights and he has not suppressed our organs of public 
expression.”28 That’s a defense answering a critique, not a strong 
affirmative case for the New Deal program. 
 
CALIFORNIA: THE 1930S AND THE BIG BUSINESS ROOTS OF MODERN CONSERVATISM 
(2015) (arguing modern conservatism grew out of Californian agribusiness manipulating 
fears of cultural change); KEVIN M. KRUSE, ONE NATION UNDER GOD: HOW 
CORPORATE AMERICA INVENTED CHRISTIAN AMERICA (2016) (linking the rise of 
religious references in conservative public discourse with backlash against the New Deal).  
 24. See J. Gresham Machen, Child Labor Amendment: It Is Regarded as Invasion of 
the Liberty of American Family Life, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1933, at 18. 
 25. Col. Roosevelt Sets Fall “Issue”: He Asserts Fall Campaign Will Be Based on 
“Defense of Bill of Rights,” N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1934, at 14. 
 26. See Hoover on Air Tomorrow: Will Speak on “Bill of Rights” at San Diego 
Constitution Day, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1935, at 2. 
 27. Norman C. Norman, Finds Rights Gone Under the NRA: One Who Heard the 
President Checked Up for Himself, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1934, at 18. 
 28. Leo M. Glassman, Not a Dictator: President Is Fulfilling a Trust by Constitutional 
Means, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1933, at 12. 
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Shifting the emphasis to the critics suggests a possible 
alternative framing. Magliocca emphasizes the employment of the 
Bill of Rights in rhetoric defending robust government programs. 
He’s right that it could and did have that function on occasion. 
But in every example Magliocca offers, it’s very much in a 
reactionary mode: someone asserts that the Bill of Rights ought 
to restrict some exercise of governmental power, and the 
proponent of power then finds a way to invoke the Bill of Rights 
in defending that power. In 1787, the federalist supporters of the 
Constitution were confronted by antifederalists insisting that a bill 
of rights in some form spell out limits on the federal government; 
the federalists eventually compromised and amended the 
Constitution, using the amendments to legitimize the more 
powerful national government (the “tub to the whale,” as cynical 
antifederalists observed). A century later, critics of America’s 
colonial government in the Philippines excoriated the denial of 
constitutional rights by the United States; the President and 
Supreme Court then invoked a partial application of the Bill of 
Rights to shore up the legitimacy of American rule. And then with 
the coming of the New Deal, critics alleged that the expansion of 
federal power and activity would offend the Bill of Rights. Again, 
the proponents of government power developed a counter-
strategy for invoking the Bill of Rights. In this narrative, the Bill 
of Rights emerges as a weapon in the arsenal of groups opposed 
to expansive federal power—a weapon, but not a very effective 
one, given the fluency of power proponents in finding answering 
arguments. 
In the New Deal period specifically, more attention to the 
critics would help link the story that Magliocca tells with other 
recent historical scholarship on the transformation of rights 
litigation in the period. Specific rights within the Bill of Rights, 
particularly free speech, got renewed attention as business leaders 
realized that they could provide a legal basis for opposing the 
regulatory apparatus of the expanding New Deal state, as works 
by Laura Weinrib and Jeremy Kessler have demonstrated.29 They 
found themselves in an unlikely alliance with labor activists, who 
 
 29. See LAURA WEINRIB, THE TAMING OF FREE SPEECH: AMERICA’S CIVIL 
LIBERTIES COMPROMISE (2016) (discussing the changing conception of civil liberties from 
its radical roots to constitutional compromise); Jeremy K. Kessler, The Early Years of First 
Amendment Lochnerism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1915 (2016) (arguing critics overstate the 
novelty of using the first amendment for libertarian purposes and underestimate the 
difficulty of disentangling judicial tendencies to do so). 
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had become interested in using the First Amendment’s free 
speech clause to protect labor protest.30 As business and labor 
coalesced around their shared interest in a libertarian and anti-
regulatory rights regime, the Bill of Rights became shared ground. 
Perhaps it’s from this, as much as from Roosevelt’s invocation of 
the Bill of Rights, that the document began to take a larger place 
in the American imagination and popular discourse. 
This addition to the narrative would perhaps lessen the 
punch of one of Magliocca’s arguments, namely, that the 
libertarian use of the Bill of Rights is contingent and relatively 
recent. A modest version of this argument is persuasive: 
Magliocca has amply documented the fact that the Bill of Rights 
were used for other purposes and read in other ways in the past. 
Magliocca, to his credit, doesn’t claim more than this. But readers 
might be inclined to see in the book a more lopsided story, in 
which the libertarian turn really is an innovation from the middle 
of the twentieth century. That would be a mistake. 
In any case, Magliocca’s next point is certainly right: the 
libertarian reading was reiterated through the Cold War. Though 
some worried that the protections of the Bill of Rights might 
handicap American efforts to defend itself against Communism, 
others took the opposite perspective. Many cited the Bill of 
Rights as protecting the United States from “‘Communist 
tyranny’” (as the 1960 Democratic Party platform put it) (p. 139). 
And the American “rights talk” had international reverberations; 
Magliocca notes that the Bill of Rights also influenced the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights at the very outset of the 
Cold War era. By the end of the Cold War, the Bill of Rights had 
a cultural resonance, even a mythology, built around them. It felt 
to Americans as though it had deep historical roots. But this is 
because memories of a different era are short. Magliocca has 
made it clear how much change the “Bill of Rights” has 
undergone as a concept in the American imagination. 
V. BILL OF RIGHTS AS PHRASE? 
The Heart of the Constitution is a significant contribution to 
the history of the Bill of Rights. It’s not entirely a new observation 
that the Bill of Rights was an afterthought and did not have much 
 
 30. See id. 
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practical, observable effects for many years.31 But Magliocca has 
provided the most thorough treatment of this history to date as it 
relates to American political and legal discourse. And he has done 
so in an accessible form. That’s no mean feat and in itself makes 
this a valuable work. Magliocca’s second argument, that the Bill 
of Rights has a longer and richer history of facilitating robust 
government action, is again not an entirely new observation.32 
Various historical actors covered in the book made this 
observation, from the antifederalists (who predicted it with their 
“tub to the whale” analogy) to Justice Jackson (who endorsed it, 
as we have seen). Again, Magliocca has greatly enriched our 
understanding by demonstrating how often the Bill of Rights was 
used to facilitate power throughout its history. 
But many questions are left unanswered. Not all of them are 
of equal importance. There are points where answering some 
questions about methodology might have helped clarify the 
strength of his arguments. At other places, the unanswered 
questions are really just a wish list of research topics for future 
work. There is only so much one can do in a short volume like this, 
so it should not detract from the book’s accomplishment to say 
that this book leaves many interesting questions unanswered, 
even as it has helpfully opened up lines of inquiry that should lead 
to further historical study and analysis. 
A. CONCEPTS AND METHODOLOGY 
The Heart of the Constitution is really a history of three 
things: first, a text proposed by Congress and enacted as a set of 
amendments to the Constitution; second, a concept that gradually 
became associated with the document; third, a phrase (“Bill of 
Rights”) that was associated with the document and the concept, 
but not consistently. But Magliocca doesn’t separate these out and 
treat them distinctly. Much (not all) of the book is spent on the 
third subject, simply tracking the phrase across American history 
(and mostly in statements by legal and government actors) and 
examining when it does and doesn’t mean what we today think it 
 
 31. See, e.g., Michael J. Douma, How the First Ten Amendments Became the Bill of 
Rights, 15 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 593, 593 n.a1 (2017); Lael Daniel Weinberger, 
Enforcing the Bill of Rights in the United States, in JURISPRUDENCE OF LIBERTY 93 (Suri 
Ratnapala & Gabriël A. Moens, eds. 2011).  
 32. Magliocca previously presented this argument: see Gerard N. Magliocca, The Bill 
of Rights as a Term of Art, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 231 (2016). 
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does. Through this history of the phrase, Magliocca also seeks to 
tell a story about the other two subjects, the document and the 
concept. On the whole, he does quite well in getting the maximum 
mileage out of this material. Changes in the use and frequency of 
the phrase can shed light on changes in the understanding of the 
text and of the conceptual object that we think about when we say 
“bill of rights.” He’s sensitive to the subtly different uses made of 
the same words in different places and times. All of this is good as 
far as it goes—but it isn’t so very far. Tracking particular language 
across time can be enlightening but really is just a starting point. 
Even the most thorough tracing of a phrase leaves a lot out that 
we might care about when we want to understand the history of 
the text and the concept.33 
A bit more explanation about Magliocca’s method would 
have been helpful. First, to the extent that the focus is on tracing 
a particular phrase, it would be nice to know how Magliocca found 
the references that he discusses: keyword searches, presumably, 
formed an important part. But for what terms? Across what 
databases? And what, if anything, did he rely on besides keyword 
searches to turn up relevant materials? This is what Michael 
Douma did in an article on the changing usage of “Bill of Rights”34 
(which Magliocca cites). If much of Magliocca’s work is really 
driven by word searches across databases, it would be nice to 
know more about the limits of the enterprise. And from there I 
have a wish-list of additional data that I would suspect he could 
have easily provided. For instance, Magliocca could have offered 
some basic quantitative information: if he can isolate a number of 
recurring alternative names for the Bill of Rights, could we get 
counts of how often particular usages turned up across time, or 
relative to each other? Does it matter what genre Magliocca is 
examining? (He focuses primarily on statements by courts and 
government actors. He doesn’t spend much time discussing other 
cultural reference points—school textbooks, for instance.35) More 
information here would have made it possible to evaluate 
 
 33. For analysis of the relationship between terminology and concept, and an 
argument about how to use the former to write a history of the latter, see PETER DE BOLLA, 
THE ARCHITECTURE OF CONCEPTS: THE HISTORICAL FORMATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
(2013). For critical analysis of de Bolla’s approach, see Michael Gavin, Intellectual History 
and the Computational Turn, 58 EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 249 (2017). 
 34. See Douma, supra note 31, at 598. 
 35. Douma has argued that textbooks were a key site for defining and developing the 
idea of the Bill of Rights. See Douma, supra note 31, at 608–11. 
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Magliocca’s comparative assessments of how often people 
referred to the text by one name or another. As it is, it is hard to 
know how often people talked about the first ten amendments to 
the Constitution by other names relative to later references to the 
“Bill of Rights.” 
The book is short and is written so as to be accessible to a 
broad audience. Its confident narrative voice does this effectively. 
But it also tends to push these methodological issues out of the 
text. It certainly seems like a plausible judgement that lay readers 
would rather read a story with clear narrative lines than see a 
chart with numbers of occurrences of words or terms. But 
academic readers are poorer for this choice, understandable 
though it may be. 
B. NEXT STEPS FOR THE HISTORY OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
While Magliocca has provided a rich account, there’s plenty 
to be done to develop a better understanding of the Bill of Rights 
history. Future work would do well to scrutinize about what’s 
going on with the “Bill of Rights” as text and concept even when 
the label isn’t present. It is not as though Magliocca’s book ignores 
the Bill of Rights when it isn’t labeled as such. The book talks 
about the alternative labels offered for the text as a whole. But 
there is little treatment of an even bigger issue: how did individual 
amendments (within the ten that make up the Bill of Rights) 
change over time, and how did their trajectories affect the history 
of the Bill of Rights as a whole? This is an enormous subject and 
it’s understandable that it needs to be cabined to keep this book 
to a manageable length. But it’s worth considering what kinds of 
questions, and possibilities, this introduces. And it’s worth 
wondering if one can actually tell a complete story about the Bill 
of Rights as a whole without telling a lot of individual stories 
about specific rights. 
Start with the simple methodological move that’s at the heart 
of the book as it stands—tracing particular language across time. 
Some of this language appears in court cases. But courts don’t 
deal in abstract principles but in concrete disputes between 
parties suing each other. Courts don’t apply “the bill of rights” as 
a whole. They apply particular provisions to the case in front of 
them. The courts of course aren’t operating in a vacuum. Judges’ 
ideas about the structure of government, legal interpretation, and 
the place of particular constitutional amendments in the broader 
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whole of the Constitution all affect their reasoning in individual 
cases. But the point is that courts will deal with individual 
provisions of a particular amendment often without having any 
occasion to reflect on the larger functions of the Bill of Rights. It’s 
then hard for me to imagine that the kinds of decisions they make 
with individual provisions don’t affect the judge’s broader 
interpretation of Bill of Rights as whole. 
The effects of individual provisions on broader views of the 
Bill of Rights isn’t just a matter for the courts. The legal issues 
that arise relating to the Bill of Rights also might matter for 
putting the issue in the public eye. For instance, maybe it matters 
that the Fifth Amendment, with its mix of criminal procedure 
issues and takings issues, was more likely to bring the Bill of 
Rights into the Supreme Court in the nineteenth century, while 
the First Amendment only became a serious issue in the Supreme 
Court in the mid-twentieth century.36 One might think that the 
Bill of Rights might be more interesting and meaningful to a 
broader swath of Americans when those Americans could 
imagine themselves benefitting from its protection. And maybe a 
wider swath of Americans could imagine themselves claiming the 
benefits of the free speech clause than could imagine themselves 
in run-ins with law enforcement or with eminent domain. Maybe 
the property-protecting cases were so embroiled in the political 
controversies of the Progressive era that it was impossible to 
imagine a bipartisan constituency rallying around these issues as 
part of a quintessentially American Bill of Rights. It’s easy to 
hypothesize possible variations on the relationship. In any case, it 
certainly seems likely that the kinds of cases that were brought 
mattered in terms of who thought about, and what attitudes 
people would form toward, the Bill of Rights. And to the extent 
they matter, they at least complicate the story that Magliocca tells, 
in which he looks almost exclusively at the ways that the Bill of 
Rights as a whole were invoked. 
One could take this a step further. Perhaps the cultural and 
intellectual history of the Bill of Rights requires considering 
 
 36. For a rough comparison, the Supreme Court Database (1791–1945) lists only 
twelve cases involving the First Amendment before 1921. See generally HAROLD SPAETH 
ET AL., SUPREME COURT DATABASE CODE BOOK (2017), 
http://supremecourtdatabase.org (searching LG04-TREEHOUSE-2438). By contrast, it 
lists 126 cases involving the Fifth Amendment in that same period. Id. (searching LG04-
BIRDDOG-6670).  
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“rights talk” beyond even the direct content of the Bill of Rights. 
To take an episode that Magliocca mentions but doesn’t reflect 
on at much length: the popularity and cultural cache of the Bill of 
Rights during World War II is tied to the “four freedoms,” and 
vice versa. Two of the four freedoms are derivative of the Bill of 
Rights. Magliocca briefly discusses the Four Freedoms, but 
suggests that they are less informative about attitudes toward the 
Bill of Rights, precisely because half of the content is not from the 
Constitution. But maybe the relationship is still more 
complicated. Maybe Americans became more excited about the 
Bill of Rights when they paid less attention to what was in the Bill 
of Rights and more to the general idea of freedom for which the 
Bill of Rights was just a symbol. The Bill of Rights today is a 
potent symbol and yet there’s widespread ignorance of its 
contents; one study in 2015 found that about 12% of Americans 
thought that the Bill of Rights included a right to own a pet, while 
one in four thought that it protects a right to “equal pay for equal 
work.”37 A 2019 survey found that 1 in 5 respondents thought that 
“the first 10 amendments of the U.S. Constitution are called the 
Declaration of Independence instead of the Bill of Rights.”38 
Maybe part of the Bill of Rights’ history is a story about public 
ignorance of its actual contents. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Bill of Rights is one of those texts that seems to stand for 
principles as old as the nation. The Heart of the Constitution 
unsettles this assumption. Gerard Magliocca reminds us that the 
Bill of Rights was not always just one thing—indeed, for a while, 
it wasn’t a “thing” at all. Its name, its recognition as a single, 
thematically-coherent document, its rise to the status of venerated 
text were products of history. Magliocca has provided a rich 
account of the Bill of Rights’ place in American culture across two 
centuries, in this crisp, concise, eminently readable book. One 
need not agree with every detail of Magliocca’s account to 
 
 37. Is There a Constitutional Right to Own a Home or a Pet?, ANNENBERG PUB. 
POL’Y CTR. (Sept. 16, 2015), https://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/is-there-a-
constitutional-right-to-own-a-home-or-a-pet/; Matthew Shaw, Civic Illiteracy in America, 
HARV. POL. REV. (May 25, 2017), https://harvardpolitics.com/culture/civic-illiteracy-in-
america/. 
 38. ABA Survey of Civic Literacy, A.B.A.: YOURABA (May 2019), https://www.
americanbar.org/news/abanews/publications/youraba/2019/may-2019/aba-survey-of-civic-
knowledge-shows-some-confusion-amid-the-awar/. 
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recognize that it is a valuable contribution to our understanding 
of constitutional history. 
 
